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For almost a decade there has been a debate in the computational discourse community between
proponents of theories based on domain	independent rhetorical relations 
most notably Rhetorical
Structure Theory 
Mann and Thompson  henceforth RST and those who subscribe to theo	
ries based on intentionality 
most notably that of Grosz and Sidner 
 henceforth GS Be	
sides its inherent intellectual interest this debate is important because it has divided the discourse
community Researchers interested in generating multisentential utterances eg 
McKeown 
Hovy  Moore and Paris  have developed algorithms and systems that rely on rhetorical
relations while researchers working in interpretation have focused on inferring the intentions of
discourse participants and tracking attentional state Now of course this is an oversimplied view
Some researchers eg 
Hobbs  argue that rhetorical or coherence relations are needed for
interpretation and others 
Moore and Paris  have tried to integrate the two approaches Still
in large part due to the debate between these two theories there has been little interaction and
cross	fertilization between the two communities
In this paper we compare what GS and RST say about how speakers intentions determine a
structure of their discourse We use the term Intentional Linguistic Structure or ILS as a theory	
neutral way of referring to this structure The denition of ILS comprises one of the major claims
in GS ILS is not directly addressed in RST but is implicit in the RST concept of nuclearity We
argue that the key to reconciling ILS in the two theories lies in the correspondence between 
a the
dominance relation between intentions in GS and 
b the nucleussatellite relation between text
spans in RST Roughly speaking an RST nucleus expresses a GS intention I
n
 a satellite expresses
another intention I
s
and in GS I
n
dominates I
s
 The correspondence between GS dominance
and RST nuclearity helps to clarify the relationship between ILS and informational structure In
particular the undesirable possibility that RST informational structure could be incompatible with

intentional structure 
Moore and Pollack  is explained Further we argue that a synthesis
of GS and RST is possible because the correspondence between dominance and nuclearity forms
a great deal of common ground and because the remaining claims in the two theories are also
consistent
 Intentional Linguistic Structure in GS
GS is formulated in terms of the interdependence of three distinct structures Of the three
structures it is the eect of intentional structure on linguistic structure that concerns us in this
paper This eect is an explicit claim about ILS
In GS the intentional structure consists of the set of the speakers communicative intentions
throughout the discourse and the relations of dominance and satisfactionprecedence among these
intentions The speaker tries to realize each intention by saying something ie each intention is
the purpose behind one or more of the speakers utterances Intentions are thus an extension of the
intentions in Grices 
 theory of utterance meaning Speakers intend the intentions behind
their utterances to be recognized and for that recognition to be part of what makes their utterances
eective A purpose I
m
dominates another purpose I
n
when satisfying I
n
is part of satisfying I
m
 A
purpose I
n
satisfaction	precedes another purpose I
m
when I
n
must be satised rst The dominance
and satisfaction	precedence relations impose a structure on the set of the speakers intentions the
intentional structure of the discourse and this in turn determines the linguistic structure
The linguistic structure of a particular discourse is made up of segments which are sets of
utterances related by embeddedness and sequential order A segment DS
n
originates with the
speakers intention it is exactly those utterances that the speaker produces in order to satisfy a
communicative intention I
n
in the intentional structure In other words I
n
is the discourse segment
purpose 
DSP of DS
n
 DS
n
is embedded in another segment DS
m
just when the purposes of the
two segments are in the dominance relation ie I
m
dominates I
n
 The dominance relation among
intentions fully determines the embeddedness relations of the discourse segments that realize them
For example consider the discourse shown in Figure  adapted from Mann and Thompson 

The whole discourse is a segment DS
 
 that attempts to realize I
 
 the speakers intention for
the hearer to adopt the intention of attending the ballet As part of her plan to achieve I
 
 the

Intentional Linguistic
Structure Structure
I
 
 Intend
S

Intend
H
a
j
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
 Intend
S
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H
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j
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S
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H
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 

a Come and see the LA Chamber Ballets concert
DS


b The show should be very entertaining
DS


c It presents all new choreography
Figure  For GS dominance in intentional structure determines embedding in linguistic structure
speaker generates I

 the intention for the hearer to adopt the belief that the ballet will be very
entertaining Then as part of her plan to achieve I

 the speaker generates I

 the intention that
the hearer believe that the show is made up of all new choreography As shown on the left in
Figure  I
 
dominates I

 which in turn dominates I

 Due to these dominance relations the
discourse segment that realizes I

is embedded in the discourse segment for I

 which is in turn
embedded within the discourse segment for I
 
 as shown on the right in the gure The dominance
of intentions directly determines embedding of segments
When one DSP I
n
satisfaction	precedes another I
m
 then DS
n
precedes DS
m
in the discourse
The satisfaction	precedes relation among intentions constrains the order of segments in the dis	
course but it does not fully determine it In the example none of the intentions satisfaction
precedes the others
A segment may contain individual utterances as well as embedded segments Because it will be
important to the discussion below we coin the term core to refer to those utterances in a segment
that do not belong to an embedded segment In the example 
a is the core of DS
 
 
b the core
of DS

and 
c the core of DS

 As will be discussed a core functions to manifest the purpose of
the segment while the embedded segments serve to help achieve that purpose
It should be clear that the theory	independent notion of ILS as it was characterized above is
exactly the linguistic structure in GS ILS is something GS makes explicit claims about By
choosing to modify the terminology from simply linguistic structure to intentional linguistic
structure we mean to suggest that consideration of something other than speaker intentions

namely semantic relations could determine another kind of structure to the discourse Clearly the
semantic or informational relations among discourse entities can in principle be the determinant
of a separate linguistic structure Whether or not such an informational structure is useful or
is related in an interesting way to ILS is a question requiring further research We discuss the
relationship between ILS and possible approaches to informational structure briey in x
 Intentional Linguistic Structure in RST
In contrast to its explicitness in GS ILS is only implicit in RST In order to identify the implicit
claims about ILS we must rst identify the components of an RST analysis that involve a judgement
about the relation between intentions underlying text spans
The range of possible RST text structures is dened by a set of schemas  which describe
the structural arrangement of spans or text constituents Schemas are basic structural units or
patterns in the application of RST relations There are ve schema patterns each consisting of
two or more spans a specication of each span as either nucleus or satellite and a specication of
the RST relation
s that exist between these spans In this paper we focus on the most commonly
occurring RST schema which consists of two text spans 
a nucleus and a satellite and a single RST
relation that holds between them The nucleus is dened as the element that is more essential
to the speakers purpose while the satellite is functionally dependent on the nucleus and could
usually be replaced with a dierent satellite As we argue below this functional distinction between
nucleus and satellite is an implicit claim about ILS and is a crucial notion in understanding the
correspondence between RST and GS
A schema application describes the structure of a larger span of text in terms of multiple
constituent spans Each of the constituent spans may in turn have a structure of subconstituent
spans Thus the application of RST schemas in the analysis of a text is recursive ie one schema
application may be embedded in another To be an acceptable RST analysis there must be one
schema application under which the entire text is subsumed and which accounts for all minimal
units usually clauses of the text In addition each minimal unit can appear in exactly one schema
application and the spans constituting each schema application must be adjacent in the text These
constraints guarantee that a correct RST analysis will form a tree structure
An instantiated schema species the RST relation
s between its constituent spans Each rela	

tion is dened in terms of a set of constraints on the nucleus the satellite and the nucleus	satellite
combination as well as a specication of the eect that the speaker is attempting to achieve on
the hearers beliefs or inclinations An RST analyst must judge which schema consists of RST
relation denitions whose constraints and eects best describe the nucleus and satellite spans in
the schema application Mann and Thompson claimed that for each two consecutive spans in a
coherent discourse a single RST relation will be primary For reasons discussed in Section  we
consider only the RST presentational relations or what Moore and Pollack 
 call intentional
relations in identifying the ILS claims of RST
To illustrate how a speakers intentions determine discourse structure in this theory consider
the RST analysis of the example discourse from Figure  As shown in Figure  at the top level
the text is broken down into two spans 
a and 
b	c The span 
b	c forms a satellite that stands
in a motivation relation to 
a This span can be further broken down into the two minimal units

b and 
c where 
c is a satellite that stands in an evidence relation to 
b


a	c
j motivation
j
a b	c
j evidence
j
b c
Figure  The RST structure assigned to the example discourse in Figure 
While there is no direct representation of intentions in RST the asymmetry between a nucleus
and its satellite originates with the speakers intentions The nucleus expresses a belief or action that
the hearer is intended to adopt The satellite provides information that is intended to increase the
hearers belief in or desire to adopt the nucleus Implicitly this is a claim that the text is structured
by the speakers intentions and more specically by the dierence between the intention that the
hearer adopt a belief or desire expressed in a text span and the intention that a span contribute
to this adoption In the example the nucleus 
a expresses an action that the speaker intends the
hearer to adopt The satellite 
b	c is intended to facilitate this adoption by providing the hearer
 
Space does not permit the denition of the motivation and evidence relations to be included here See Mann and
Thompson 

with a motivation for doing the suggested action In the embedded span the nucleus 
b expresses
a belief that the speaker intends the hearer to adopt and the satellite 
c is intended to facilitate
this adoption by providing evidence for the belief
The second implicit RST claim about ILS is a renement of the rst The set of intentional
relations is a range of ways a speaker can aect the hearers adoption of a nucleus by including a
satellite That is not only is there a functional distinction between nucleus and satellites there
is also a classication of satellites according to how they help achieve the hearers adoption of the
nucleus Translating this into a claim about ILS text is structured by the ways in which some
utterances are intended to help other utterances achieve their purpose
 Correspondence between Dominance and Nuclearity
Now we are in a position to compare the explicit claims of GS about ILS with the implicit
ones of RST Both theories agree that a discourse is structured into a hierarchy of nonoverlapping
constituents segments in GS and spans in RST Each subconstituent may in turn be structured in
exactly the same way as the larger constituent Supercially the similarity ends there because the
internal structure of segments and spans is dierent In GS the internal structure of a segment
consists of any number of embedded segments plus what we are calling the core those utterances
that express the discourse segment purpose and do not belong to any embedded segment In RST
the internal structure of a span consists of a nucleus which we have characterized as expressing
a belief or action the hearer is intended to adopt a satellite which is intended to facilitate that
adoption and an intentional relation between the nucleus and satellite
If we look more closely at the correspondence between dominance and nuclearity we nd that the
structure of spans and segments are nearly identical Specically an embedded segment corresponds
to a satellite and the core corresponds to the nucleus Or because GS are not committed
to a segment having both a core and embedded segments a more accurate characterization of
the correspondence would be that the nucleus manifests a dominating intention while a satellite
manifests a dominated intention That is dominance in GS corresponds closely to nuclearity in
RST There is a relationship which we can crudely characterize as that of linguistic manifestation
that links the nucleus to a dominating intention and a satellite to a dominated intention Exactly

how to derive a communicative intention from an utterance and vice versa is one of the main
research issues in computational linguistics Here we simply assume that an utterance conveys
either a belief or an action p and thereby makes manifest the speakers intention that the hearer
adopt belief in or an intention to perform p
The correspondence suggests a mapping between GS linguistic structure and RST text struc	
ture An embedded segment in GS will be analyzed as a satellite in RST and the segment core
will be the nucleus When there are multiple embedded segments in GS each subsegment will be
analyzed as an RST satellite In these cases of multiple subsegments the GS core and an adjacent
subsegment will be analyzed as an RST nucleus and satellite forming an RST span This span is
then the nucleus of a higher span in which the satellite is an additional GS subsegment from the
same segment The possibility of a coreless segment creates a complication in this mapping In
GS the denition of linguistic structure does not require a segment to contain a core According
to the theory a segment can be composed entirely of embedded segments In the RST schemas
considered thus far a span always consists of a nucleus and satellite A less common schema
pattern known as the joint schema contains multiple spans with no nucleus	satellite distinction
among them joined into a single span Coreless segments in GS map to these joint schemas in
RST
Building on the correspondence between dominance and nuclearity we raise two issues in the
next sections First how do informational relations t into the discourse structure Second what
synthesis of the two theories emerges when we recognize the correspondence
 Informational structure
Moore and Pollack 
 argued that RST denes two types of relations intentional relations
which arise from the ways in which consecutive discourse elements participate in the speakers plan
to aect the hearers mental state and informational relations between the information conveyed in
consecutive elements of a coherent discourse This is consistent with Mann and Thompsons 

p  distinction between presentational 
intentional and subject matter 
informational
relations However while Mann and Thompson maintain that for any two consecutive elements
of a coherent discourse one rhetorical relation will be primary 
ie related by an informational
or an intentional relation Moore and Pollack showed that discourse interpretation and genera	

tion require that intentional and informational analyses exist simultaneously Thus in addition
to the Intentional Linguistic Structure discussed so far a discourse may simultaneously have an
informational structure imposed by domain relations among the objects states and events being
discussed
  Can intentional and informational structure dier in RST
In addition to their claim that intentional and informational analyses must co	exist Moore and
Pollack presented an example in which the intentional and informational relations can impose a dif	
ferent structure on the discourse However it is important to understand that their example shows
that the strict application of RST informational relations determine a discourse structure that is
incompatible with the one determined by RST intentional relations That is the incompatibility
arises because of the way in which RST relations are dened More precisely the incompatibility
arises because the nucleus and satellite relationships in the intentional analysis of the discourse are
inverted in the informational analysis for the particular example given by Moore and Pollack
Now in x we argued that nuclearity in an RST analysis is an implicit claim about speaker
intentions corresponding to the GS relation of dominance among intentions That is nuclearity
rightly belongs in the denitions of intentional relations However we argue that informational
relations properly construed should not distinguish between nucleus and satellite in their de	
nitions As an example consider the pair of RST relations volitionalcause and volitionalresult
The volitionalcause is dened as one in which the nucleus presents a volitional action and the
satellite presents a situation that could have caused the agent to perform the action The eect of
this relation is that the reader recognizes the situation presented in the satellite as a cause of the
volitional action presented in the nucleus The volitionalresult relation is nearly identical except
that the cause of the action is the nucleus and the result is the satellite Why does RST need two
relations to capture this The reason is that the same domain relation call it causeeect  links
a cause and eect regardless of which is the nucleus For a particular instance of a causeeect
in the domain it is equally plausible for a speaker to mention the eect to facilitate the hearers
adoption of belief in the cause or to mention the cause to facilitate the hearers adoption of belief
in the eect Moreover this is precisely what the intentional relations capture By incorporating
the nucleus	satellite distinction in the denitions of RST informational relations these relations in	

clude an implicit analysis of intentional structure As a consequence strict application of the RST
informational relations can result in a dierent structure than the intentional relations and this is
the source of the problem noted by Moore and Pollack Because nuclearity can only be determined
by consideration of intentions and intentional and informational analyses of a discourse must co	
exist we argue that the solution to the problem is to properly relegate information about nuclearity

intention dominance to the intentional analysis and remove it from denitions of informational
relations In this way these two determinants of discourse structure cannot conict In addition
note that this is preferable to adding additional informational relations to allow either relatum to
be the nucleus 
as was done in the volitionalcause and volitionalresult case because this obscures
the fact that relations such as volitionalcause and volitionalresult appeal to the same underlying
domain relation
  Relationship between ILS and informational structure
Once we recognize that an informational analysis is needed simultaneously with ILS and that the
informational analysis should be determined by domain relations without reference to how the
relations are employed by the speaker exactly how to determine informational structure becomes
an underconstrained question Should all domain relations across utterances be analyzed in the
informational structure What patterns of informational relations are employed in realizing various
kinds of intentions and what analysis provides a reliable means for identifying such patterns Final
answers to these questions require further research Because constraints may be needed in order
to make progress on these issues we point out two approaches to constraining the denition of
informational structure In Section  we suggest that RST informational relations provide a
version of one of these approaches
The most inclusive denition of informational structure would contain all the domain relations
between the things being talked about Included would be causal relations of various sorts set
relations relations underlying bridging inferences 
Clark and Haviland  and the relation of
identity between domain objects underlying coreference of noun phrases across utterances By
this denition informational structure is a complex network of domain relations that is dened
independently of the intentional structure An analysis that keeps track of all domain relations
in a discourse is an overwhelming task that is often infeasible One approach to constraining

informational structure is to dene it as parasitic on intentional structure The informational
structure would contain an accompanying informational relation for each intentional relation A
second approach to constraining informational structure is to dene it as a network of domain
relations with type restrictions on the relata The informational structure would contain only the
relations among situations events and actions the types of entities referred to by clauses
 A partial synthesis
The discussion in Section  suggests that RST and GS share a large amount of common ground
That is many of the claims in the two theories although formulated dierently are essentially
equivalent To begin this section we state the common ground that emerges from relating domi	
nance and nuclearity Then we briey review the claims of each theory that are outside this common
ground Each theory has some consistent ground additional claims that concern issues simply not
addressed by the other theory The actual contentious ground claims made by one theory that are
incompatible with the other is quite small
 Common ground
Building on the correspondence between dominance and nuclearity a partial synthesis of GS and
RST would be roughly the following A segmentspan arises because its speaker is attempting
to achieve a communicative purpose Such purposes have the feature that they are achieved in
part by being recognized by hearers Thus the plan for achieving the purpose typically has two
distinct parts 
 one or more utterances that serve to make the purpose manifest by expressing a
belief or action for the hearer to adopt 
the corenucleus and 
 a set of subparts that contribute
to achieving the purpose by manifesting subpurposes dominated by that purpose 
the embedded
segmentssatellites
Note that this synthesis encompasses the ILS claims of both theories regarding the example
discourse DS
 
is a segmentspan designed to achieve the purpose I
 
 The plan for achieving I
 
is
to rst manifest I
 
by expressing the action in 
a the corenucleus and then to contribute to the
achievement of I
 
by providing the motivation in 
b	c the embedded segmentsatellite In turn
DS

is a segmentspan designed to achieve the purpose I

by rst manifesting I

in the expression of

the corenucleus 
b and then providing evidence in the embedded segmentsatellite 
c Finally I

is made manifest by 
c though no additional contribution to achieving this intention is provided
 Consistent ground
RST and GS each makes claims about issues not addressed by the other theory We review these
claims briey in order to establish that they are consistent First the two theories oer dierent
but consistent perspectives on the ordering of segmentsspans In GS intentions may be related
by satisfaction	precedence in addition to dominance One intention satisfaction	precedes another
when it must be realized before the other This relation between intentions partially constrains the
order of what is said and thus introduces a distinction between necessary order originating with
a satisfaction	precedence relation of the underlying intentions and artifactual order additional
ordering that must be imposed to produce linearized text Note that the relative ordering between
a core and embedded segments always arises as part of artifactual ordering because the underlying
intentions cannot be related by satisfaction	precedence In RST because the underlying intentions
are not analyzed explicitly the distinction between necessary and artifactual order is not available
Instead the relative ordering of corenucleus and embedded segmentsatellite is highlighted It is
claimed that many relations have a typical ordering of their nucleus and satellite The two theories
address dierent aspects of ordering without suggesting any points of contention
Second in addition to intentional and linguistic structure GS posits an attentional structure
This component determines which discourse entities will be most salient and thereby imposes
constraints on available referents for pronouns and reduced denite NPs This is an important
issue but one that RST simply does not make claims about
Finally while GS recognize that informational structure is a cue to recognition of intentional
structure the theory does not provide detail RST does provide an analysis of informational
relations Section  claimed that these relations should not include any reference to nuclearity
a modication to the original RST Without nuclearity informational relations are simply domain
relations that the hearer is intended to recognize Section  points out two approaches to dening
a constrained informational structure If we pursue an informational analysis that is parasitic on
the intentional structure then the set of modied RST informational relations are a good candidate
for the relations to use

 Contentious ground
The claims of GS and RST discussed so far have been we argued either equivalent or compatible
We now turn to a point of contention between the two theories There are distinctions among
the RST intentional relations that in GS would be subtypes of the dominance relation among
intentions However GS species that the only relations among intentions aecting discourse
structure are dominance and satisfaction	precedence Should the various RST intentional relations
be incorporated into a synthesized theory Here we suggest that because the relations have a
dierent signicance for speaker and hearer the answer depends on the application of the theory
Consider the RST distinction between motivation and enablement relations as an example
When a speaker intends that a hearer adopt the intention to do some act she manifests this
intention by for example a command to do the act At least two dierent problems may prevent
the hearers compliance giving rise to the satellites in motivation and enablement relations For
motivation the satellite supplies information in order to increase the hearers desire to comply
The speaker reasons that without the satellite information the hearer will be less likely to want to
do the suggested action For enablement the satellite supplies information in order to increase the
hearers ability to comply In this case the speaker reasons that without the satellite information
the hearer will be less likely to be able to do the suggested action The distinction between the two
relations arises from the speakers reasoning about what should be said in addition to the nucleus
in order for the span to have the desired eect the hearers adoption of an intention to act and
eventual performance of the act
From the point of view of the hearer the distinction is not signicant In the discourse of
Figure  the speaker motivates the hearer to attend the ballet by mentioning that the show will
be entertaining It is not necessary however for the hearer to recognize that the speaker intended
the comment about entertainment to have this eect Rather the hearer 
 must recognize the
informational link of identity between the show mentioned in 
b and the concert in 
a and 
 must
accept the speakers judgement of an entertaining show If these conditions obtain the hearer will
be more likely to attend the ballet Alternatively if the speaker provides the enablement satellite
The show begins at pm the hearer 
 must recognize the same informational link as before and

 must believe the statement If these conditions obtain the hearer will be better able to attend
the ballet The eect is achieved whether or not the hearer recognizes the speaker is trying to

achieve it
Since the distinction among intentional relations has signicance for the speaker but not the
hearer we suggest the distinction has more application for generation than for interpretation The
intentional relations help dene a set of reasoning tasks involved in generation of multisentential
text In suggesting an action to the hearer a system can reason about possible diculties in getting
the act adopted Consideration of how likely the hearer is to adopt the action or to be able to
perform it can help determine whether motivating or enabling information is needed Similarly
in suggesting a belief to the hearer a system can reason about possible diculties in order to
determine the most eective way to elaborate the presentation of the belief
 Conclusion
In this paper we have argued that the two most prevalent theories of discourse structure in com	
putational linguistics GS and RST are not incompatible but in fact have considerable common
ground The key to the basic similarity between these two theories is understanding the corre	
spondence between the notions of dominance in GS and nuclearity in RST Understanding this
correspondence between the theories will enable computational models that eectively synthesize
the contributions of the theories and thereby are useful both for interpretation and generation of
discourse
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